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Abstract 
 
In this paper we first describe Mexican environmental policy and the present role of 
voluntary approaches therein. In despite of different kind of efforts at this regard, it 
seems that still ISO 14000 remains the most commonly used format for voluntary 
efforts by companies in Mexico, there is also a national scheme “Industria Limpia”, or 
Clean Industry, that has more and more participation, especially among the bigger 
companies. Though voluntary, participation is by no means non-committal. An 
elaborate auditing program belongs to the scheme. This shows that there is some 
openness in Mexico regarding the options for non-regulatory environmental policy.  
 In the second part of the paper we report on the basis of a survey among 16 
Mexican business leaders that have responsibilities in the environmental management of 
their companies. None of them evaluated Mexican environmental policy as sufficient. 
Implementation is insufficient and several also think instrumentation is inapt. In those 
cases especially economic policy instruments are seen as a necessary addition, while 
also negotiated agreements are positively viewed. To improve implementation 
negotiated agreements as a framework to guide implementation is widely supported. 
Expectations regarding ambition, efficiency gains and positive side effects of the 
respondents look quite realistic giving the practical results as assessed in a study on the 
Dutch experience with negotiated agreements. The feasibility and success of negotiated 
agreements is in theoretical and empirical literature explained by four factors. The 
respondents assess these factors as quite favorable in the situation of their sectors of 
industry in Mexico. More research is necessary to gain further insight into the options 
and conditions for applying negotiated agreements in the Mexican context.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Mexican environmental situation has improved in the last decade thanks to the 
implementation of several regulatory instruments and also of some economical 
incentives for those companies certified as “clean industry”, mostly those considered 
“big size”. It is also important to mention that the “big” ones have mostly already a 
good quality environmental system implemented for a long time whit environmental 
and social goals that originate from their international corporation’s head offices. From 
this point of view the enterprise culture and financial situation seem to be key factors 
for environmental success, because those big companies are able to invest in 
environment control and pollution prevention systems. This was also reported by 
Medina in 2003 for the chemical companies in the context of Corporate Voluntary 
Environmental Initiatives (VEI) in Mexico.  
 
On the other hand, an important number of small and medium size enterprises remain 
without this recognition, because they can not comply with the legal requirements 
established by the environmental authorities. Some of their problems involve the 
perception of the complex environmental regulation and the unclear distribution of 
responsibilities among the different governmental levels. As a consequence the 
enterprise does not know directly its rights and obligations facing the local, state and 
federal governments in terms of environment regulation. 
 
Therefore, the implementation and verification of environmental quality standards 
misses transparency. From different studies, it has been shown that trust and 
communication have an important impact on the transparency of the process (Bressers 
and de Bruijn, 2005a). Those factors might be positively influenced by a voluntary 
program as “clean industry” that might have a “snow ball effect” in the industrial sector.  
 
The research in this paper will focus on the evaluation of such voluntary approaches in 
the Mexican context. Voluntary approaches get more and more attention, also outside 
the European framework where they are most widely spread (e.g. De Bruijn and 
Norberg-Bohm 2003). Recently in two subsequent issues Policy Studies Journal 
devoted no less than ten articles to this subject, in symposia edited by DeLeon and 
Rivera (2007, 2008). Among the policy instruments classified as voluntary ones, 
“negotiated agreements” have a special place, since they are what the name suggests: 
not entirely voluntary, but the result of real negotiations. The negotiations often 
concentrate on the share a certain sector of industry will take in realizing the countries’ 
environmental objectives. Negotiated agreements between governments and industrial 
sectors have had a very important role in the Dutch environmental policy and European 
environmental policy in general (e.g. Carraro and Lévêque 1999, Croci 2005, De Clercq 
2002, Delmas and Ter Laak 2001, EEA 1997, Glasbergen 1998, Jordan, Wurzel and 
Zito 2003, Mol a/o. 2000, OECD 2003, Orts and Deketelaere 2001, Rennings et. al. 
1997, Ten Brink 2002). In this paper we will also review their feasibility in the Mexican 
context, based on interviews and survey methods.  
 
In this paper the following section 2 will deal with the context of environmental 
management in Mexico, both by government and industry. Section 3 examines the 
present experience with voluntary instruments in Mexico, like the “Industria Limpia” 
(Clean Industry) program. Section 4 presents an assessment of the attitudes of a number 
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of Mexican business leaders with environmental responsibilities regarding the use of 
negotiated agreements. The last section 5 contains a short summary and conclusions.  
 
2. Environmental management in Mexico 
 
 
2.1 Environmental policy 
 
SEMARNAT, the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, has the main 
role regarding designing and implementation of environment protection rules. 
PROFEPA (Federal Attorney General for Environmental Protection) is the enforcement 
branch of SEMARNAT, charged with the supervision of the implementation of 
environmental law. Actually, with the creation in 1992 of PROFEPA the modern 
environmental policy taking place. PROFEPA’s first focus seeks to solve the problem 
of a lack of regulation for highly risky activities in Mexico. The accident in Guadalajara 
brought a higher awareness to the authorities. At the beginning, auditing was handled as 
a “voluntary-obligatory” initiative with a PROFEPA “punisher role” against the 
business sector. In the same year but in a broader framework, the summits of Rio de 
Janeiro brought an important influence and impact to Mexican environment policy. In 
1994, some other international organisations offered support for enhancement of the 
environmental policy, such as the consultancy initiative GEMI. Further more, the 
Environmental Cooperation Commission (Canada-USA-Mexico) (CCA) was created in 
the same year to face the environmental regional situation.  
 
As one of the results of the international pressure inside the business sector, in 1995 the 
environmental policy switched from the command-control strategies to a more 
preventive approach.  In terms of regulatory instruments, the coercive ones has been 
replaced or complemented with instruments of environmental management where the 
use of voluntary instruments has been enhanced, as well.  Along this voluntary 
approach, more suitable economical instruments, information transparency and a 
growing social participation have been part of the preventive approach. 
 
The modernization of the regulatory scheme relies in one hand on the modernization of 
the environmental regulation and in the other hand in a new scheme of direct regulation 
which was organised in the so called Industrial Integrated System of Regulation and 
Environmental Management (SIRG in Spanish version). 
 
The Mexican environmental regulatory scheme has a history of barely two decades, in 
spite that in the article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, the bases for the environmental 
law were already described. This article defined the utilization of the natural resources 
only on purposes related to the interest of the nation.  Nevertheless, the environmental 
matters became clearer expressed from the 70’s years through the “Environmental 
Protection Office” which reported directly to the “Secretaria de Salubridad y 
Asistencia” (Health Ministry). This political structure was legally framed in 1971 under 
the Federal Law to Prevent and Control the Environmental Pollution. 
(http://www.ine.gob.mx/ueajei/publicaciones/libros/5/marcoregu.html) 
 
In January 28th of 1988, the first publication of the “general law of ecological 
equilibrium and environmental protection” (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y 
Protección al Ambiente - LGEEPA – in Spanish) was issued (1). In fact, the LGEEPA 
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has been submitted in different periods to a revision process by a Mexican federal 
regulatory commission. The LGEEPA contains the regulations for the main 
environmental issues: water, air, soil, noise, waste management among others. The 
implementation of LGEEPA needs other supporting legal instruments like more specific 
laws, regulations and official standards. In 19 of 32 Mexican states, also state 
environmental laws were published, adding to the regional regulative framework. It has 
been also observed during the environmental protection implementation, that in case of 
lack of normative for a specific topic, the LGEEPA allows the application of 
international standards and procedures. 
 
In comparison among the regional, national and international environmental regulations, 
it has been shown by different voluntary strategies that the international ones represents 
the most well accepted by the industrial sector. Acceptance by industry, by the way, is 
one of the highest problems reported during auditing activities, because their 
representatives seek always the win-win strategy (Porter and Van Der Linde, 1995) by 
which companies are able simultaneously to improve their environmental record while 
reducing costs and/or increasing productivity and competitiveness. This is not very 
often likely to be the case for the medium and small companies because they face 
economic difficulties and clearly they get a quick return from the implementation of 
voluntary environmental programmes. 
 
In another hand, the marketing demands for the international competitiveness associate 
the environmental protection policy to the “sustainable development” aspects, and 
gradually sustainability matters have been, by consequence, incorporated in the legal 
frame. In some countries sustainability concerns are related to self-regulatory systems in 
which prevention is very strongly recommended and undertaken. Therefore e consider 
necessary to discuss in the next paragraph the Mexican circumstances at this regard. 
 
 
2.2 Mexican industry and sustainability 
 
Nowadays sustainable development is a rising issue in the Mexican debate, but its 
proponents are still perceived to have a weak empowerment. Some sectors do not even 
realize the benefits and the need of adopting a sustainable development approach as an 
umbrella concept for decision making. Besides that, it is clear that partnerships are a 
key factor to achieve the sustainability goals. At present in Mexico, the interaction 
between non governmental organizations, governments and/or businesses has been 
improved but without the proper tools and scopes to achieve sustainability. Some 
initiatives are based on the good will of the participants, while others have a monetary 
basis. Some partnerships lack a comprehensive framework to maximize each partner’s 
knowledge and value return. Some other partnerships fail because they do not meet the 
needs and perspectives of each partner involved. Therefore, many partnerships need to 
be reoriented and better organized. This situation is related to the internal 
communication strategy of the enterprise, but also to the relation of their public 
relationship office with the authorities. Enterprise groups, like industrial chambers, 
might influence the cooperation by reducing the number of actors participating during 
the negotiations. 
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A Mexican industrial chamber called COPARMEX has classified the Mexican industry 
with different labels according to some indicators of sustainability orientation, as shown 
in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Types of enterprises according to their level of sustainability orientation 
 
 
CORPORATIVE 
UNDER 
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
 
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
ABOVE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Corporate 
spirit 
Environment 
interaction 
 
Inactive 
 
Reactive 
 
Responsibility 
 
Proactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDICATORS 
GENERAL 
•Dictatorial  
  administration 
•Weak consumer  
 interaction 
•Destructive  
 behaviour 
•Low  moral 
•“No matter” attitude 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL  
•Poor disposition 
•Quality standards 
 exceeded 
•Problems ignored 
 
GENERAL 
•Hierarchical 
 administration 
•Unconnected 
 departments  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
• Legal and 
  continuously 
  accomplishment 
•Negotiation efforts 
 and presence in 
 decision maker 
 groups 
•Other departments not 
involved 
GENERAL 
•Administrative 
  participation 
•Consumer feedback 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
• No constant efforts 
•Environmental  
 management  
•Marketing  
 department 
 
•Communication with  
 concerned   
 ecological 
 organizations  
 
GENERAL 
•Institutional Ethics 
•Responsibility corporative 
and 
  authority 
•Organization in function of  
  the consumer 
•Costumer and  
  employer feedback 
•Leadership in 
multidisciplinary 
organizations 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL  
•Strategically long term  
 planning  
•All departments involved 
•Strong communication  
  program 
 
The industrial chambers have a crucial role in the interaction process needed for 
sustainability. Even more so, if one takes into consideration that at the beginning of the 
21st century there were 361,000 manufacturing businesses registered in Mexico, of 
which 99.2% are corresponding to micro, small and medium industries (table 2). At the 
moment, one confronts many difficulties when negotiating individually, as one 
industrial representative, with all the government levels. The environmental 
accomplishments are also hard to verify. At the present pace, even for the big 
companies there would be 10 years required to carry out the environmental audits, 
considering the capacity of the competent authorities. The chance of a small company to 
get an audit is 1:700.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of the Mexican enterprise size (COPARMEX, 2005) 
 
 
Denomination 
According the 
industry size 
 
Number of 
employees 
Distribution 
enterprise size in % 
(National 
Environmental Audit 
program) Record of 
enterprises 2004 
Micro 0 - 15 92,8 483
Small 16 - 100 5,4 169
Medium 101 - 250 1,0 196
Big > 250 0,8 285
 Total number of 
enterprises 
361000 1133
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In order to encourage the businesses to take care for the environment, the Ministry of 
the Environment has developed a series of programs, such as that of “self regulation” 
and that of “clean industry” (Industria Limpia), in which the industry participates 
together with the academic and government sectors for the benefit of  the local 
environment.  Nevertheless, the number of industries recorded in the “self regulation” 
program has shown a very slow progress of 183 businesses per year in the period of 
2000-2004.  Therefore, according to COPARMEX sources, it would require about 180 
years to have completed the “self regulation” system, if the participation rate remains 
the same. Another kind of strategies should be added to this kind of voluntary programs. 
 
The industrial chambers, understanding this problematic, promote sustainability efforts 
in industries where competitive advantages are observed. Those advantages arise as 
consumers seek the brands of products which have a green image, while, at the same 
time, those products improve significantly their “aggregate value” themselves. 
Strategies like this have been supported by defining guidelines helping to make the 
decisions on environmental management. Those fit and support the features of 
international system quality systems, such as ISO 14000, and concepts like business 
social responsibility, among others.   
 
An integral way to evaluate the degree of sustainability in Mexico is through the “Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index”, which initiated in September 1999 and whose objective is 
to monitor the performance of the company leaders in terms of corporate sustainability.  
As a consequence 200 businesses were selected (10% of the firms’ leaders in 73 
industrial groups in the 33 countries covered by the index).  Subsequently they mention 
some of the advantages of sustainable development, which can be measured with the 
sustainability indicators:  
• Today the environment is a strategic issue 
• Continuity of the business 
• Competitiveness 
• Creation, participation and expansion of markets 
• Technological innovation 
• Strengthening of the brand image 
• Shareholders prefer sustainable businesses 
• The sustainability problem possesses economic and social repercussions 
(efficient use and sustainable of resources)  
• Better positioning given the taste of the consumer. 
 
To summarize, the sustainability issue in the Mexican industry is finding an opportunity 
moment, specially now, when the natural resources are not yet constraining 
development, but is seen inhibited by economic, political, and social factors. In 
December 2007, three interviews were held with government decision makers and 
representatives of industrial chambers. Their remarks match perfectly with this vision of 
sustainability. They highlighted the need to include more economical instruments in the 
environmental protection policies. Another suggestion was to involve stakeholders with 
“champion enterprises” in the corporate environmental policies. One of the results 
expected might be the reduction of environmental protection costs in the small 
companies, because they can exchange expertise all along the supply chain. This kind of 
mutual support could be part of “negotiated agreements” (covenant) between industry 
and government.  
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3. Existing voluntary programs stressing on “Clean Industry program” 
 
This section is based on a combination of different sources of information, including 
from industrial groups like IGEMI (Global Environmental Management Initiative) and 
some official organizations. 
 
There has already been some history in the use of voluntary and negotiated measures in 
Mexican environmental policy. Already in 1995 the covenant of “Environmental 
Protection and Business Competitiveness” was signed among the confederation of 
industrial chambers (Concamin), the Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources SEMARNAT and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Secofi). The first 
covenant on environmental self-regulation was also signed that year. A year later 14 
covenants on environmental self-regulation were signed. The same year saw the arising 
of the “Integrated System of Regulation and Environmental Management” for the 
Industry (SIRG) with three fundamental components:   
• Unique Environmental license (LAU); 
• Register of Annual Operation (COA); 
• Voluntary Programs of Management (PGV’s). 
At present, the LAU fails to consolidate entirely due to the slowness in the changes 
required. The COA does not bring reliable information. The PVG's failed when the 
government distrusted the companies. 
 
After in 1996 the ISO 14001 standard was born, the same year the first certification of 
an industrial process inside a Mexican business was announced (“Altos Hornos de 
Mexico”, a metal-mechanical industry). In resolution 97/02 the federal agency 
PROFEPA tried to utilize the Environmental Cooperation Commission (Canada-USA-
Mexico) (CCA) as an international shield to impose its 10 elements for "environmental 
management" over those of ISO 14001. In 1999 PROFEPA proposed the National 
System of Compliance Indicators for Environmental regulations (SICNA). The 
application of this system was considered pseudo-voluntary, but the industry reverted 
the tendency. 
 
From 2000 onwards IGEMI (Global Environmental Management Initiative) is the first 
business organization in delivering voluntarily the RETC (Record of emissions of toxic 
pollutants). This is an obligatory procedure for the industry. It also signs the first 
covenant on environmental self-supervising. IGEMI launches its first tool of self-
supervising. A year later IGEMI started its first project with suppliers. The next year 
2002 IGEMI proposed the creation of recognition for the “Environmental excellence”.  
PROFEPA took the idea and landed it. This would become the “Industria Limpia” 
program. In 2004 the first recognition to “environmental excellence” is delivered by the 
Mexican president, carrying it to an upper level. 
 
In 2005 CCA, IGEMI, PROFEPA, SEMARNAT, CONCAMIN and the government of 
Queretaro all together launched a project of “Green Competitive Chains” with suppliers. 
At present, the project is on its third generation in the pilot phase.  The following 
industries have participated:  Bristol-Myers Squibb (2 times); you Hang you Palmolive 
(2 times); Janssen-Cilag (1 time); Jumex (2 times); Model Group (1 time); Henkel (1 
time); Nestlé (1 time); Factory of Soap the Crown (1 time). Three of them even received 
fiscal incentives in Mexico City (Colgate-Palmolive and Bristol-Myers Squibb, and 
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somewhat later the Model Group). The issue of adding fiscal or other economic 
incentives to voluntary schemes is still a “hot topic” for the industry.  
 
The “Industria Limpia” (Clean Industry) program is an interesting voluntary scheme 
that invites industry to enroll and accept high standards of environmental responsibility. 
This program is based on different elements: 
• International quality environmental standards; 
• Good engineered practices; 
• Regulation ad hoc by sector; 
• Eco-efficiency. 
 
As result of the application of this program, most of the industries regulated by the 
federal authorities benefit the economic incentives. The percentage covered in 2007 for 
the industrial sector under ‘federal’ supervision is shown here below. 
 
100% AUTOMOBILE SECTOR 
100% CEMENT INDUSTRY  
100% BEER PRODUCTION  
100% GLASS INDUSTRY 
97% CAR BATERIES PRODUCTION 
90% DETERGENTS PRODUCTION   
95% STILL PRODUTION 
60% PHARMACEUTIC PRODUCTION 
95% PRIVATE ADMINISTRATION OF AIRPORTS 
 
Despite of this important progress, there are still a very large number of industries 
without “clean industry” recognition. In table 3, it is possible to observe how the 
“iso14000 certificate” remains the prime choice of the Mexican industry in comparison 
with the federal program of “clean industry”. 
 
 
Table 3 Number of industries with Mexican and International certifications (both 
voluntary) 
 
 
Year 
No. of industries with 
“Clean Industry” 
Certification 
No. of industries with 
“Iso14000” Certification 
1997 11 886 
1999 63 1345 
2002 369 2212 
 
 
Even though the number of enterprises subscribed to the “Environmental Audits 
National Programme” (PNAA), in 2006 has increased much since 2000 (including 
“Clean industry” and “Tourist Environmental Quality” certifications), the proportion of 
industries certified is still small compared with the total number of industries registered 
under the COPARMEX index. 
 
But from the PROFEPA’s point of view, the PNAA has become more successful in the 
last years than ever since its creation in 1992. Figure 1 shows the locations of 
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enterprises subscribed to the PNAA in 1992 and 2007 respectively. These images were 
presented during the 2007 GIN conference in Mexico by Raul Tornel, Director of the 
National Environmental Audits Office. 
 
 
Figure 1: Locations of enterprises in PNAA (PROFEPA) in 1992 and 2007 
 
 
 
 
In order to increase the industrial participation, firstly PROFEPA analysed the factors 
that restrain acceptance. Some of those factors are mentioned here: 
• Wake legal framework to offer enough guaranties; 
• Mistrust between industry and government sectors; 
• The advantages of the program are not so evident for the users; 
• Long procedure for the certification. 
 
As a second step PROFEPA authorities take measurements to deal with those factors. 
For instance a new “environmental auditory regulation” and new “official standards” 
were recently published in 2007. PROFEPA also changed the way of verification of the 
environmental control inside the industry. Since 2007 PROFEPA uses different 
approaches in accordance with the type of collaboration promoted. These are named 
“geographical”, “integral” and “sectoral”. The general goal with these different 
approaches is to enhance the confidence in the PNAA in the users’ opinion, creating a 
“domino effect”. In such way, trust between industry and government might be 
improved. 
 
In the geographical approach, PROFEPA’s goal is to incorporate 80% of the industries 
located on industrial parks or industrial areas. Certified industries should involve other 
industries located in the same physical area. 
The integral approach consists of including all the industries involved (suppliers, 
distributors and costumers) in a “production chain” from one industry already certified. 
The sectoral approach intends to attract all the industries producing a specific product 
like cement, cars, or beers. 
 
A larger communication campaign regarding PNAA has been started with the purpose 
to communicate its accompanying incentives in a simpler way. Some of those 
advantages are mentioned here: 
• Special rate of depreciation for the new equipment; 
• Better value of the company in the “index market”;  
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• Receiving Bank Credits easier due to the environmental accomplishments; 
• The industry can declare the inexistence of environmental passives, like areas 
with polluted soil. This excludes the industry from paying the cleaning of this 
kind of pollution during the first period of its declaration. But they have to 
include its cleaning up as a part of the “action plan”. 
 
Besides those advantages, the direct benefits for the industry gained are: 
• Improvement of its public image; 
• Clean Industry Certificate can be used within the marketing strategies; 
• The industry can participate on the Clean Development Mechanisms programs; 
• Obtaining cheaper risks insurance; 
• Reduction on the inspection costs. 
Those are the main benefits for the industry when they subscribe to the Clean Industry 
program (PNAA).  
 
As mentioned, one of the low participation elements in the PNAA is the perception that 
it is a complex procedure to receive the “Clean industry certification”. Therefore we 
will describe this procedure in this document.  
 
Procedure of the auditing program (PNAA - “Clean Industry”) 
The auditing program procedure consists of three stages1:  
A) Planning the auditory  
Three activities comprise this point: selection of an environmental auditor (from an 
official list); deliverance to PROFEPA of the auditing plan; official registration to the 
PNAA.  
B) Executing the auditory 
This phase is divided on 3 elements as well: start of auditing; report of auditing; 
preparation of the action plan for those aspects to improve in the industry. 
C) Post auditory 
This is the most important period in terms of negotiation and commitments. It is 
described in 4 aspects: accord on the action plan with formal signing of 
“accomplishment agreement”; monitoring of the action plan; ending of the action plan; 
official certification. 
 
The “guide to environmental self-assessment” has been published in order to be useful 
for those who desire to self-assess and to know the general state of their installations 
with regard to the legal obligations in environmental matters. This guide includes the 
legal requirements to comply with on drinking water, waste water, atmospheric 
emissions, solid waste (municipal waste), hazardous waste, soil and subsoil pollution, 
environmental risk, environmental impact, noise and Environmental System 
Administration. It includes a format guide (Program of Corrective Activities) to define 
the actions to carry out in case of normative breaches and to monitor them until they are 
solved. The guide of self-assessment is useful for its simplicity and for the fast results 
obtained. Also it is important to mention that it aims to change the attitude of personnel 
inside the organization. 
 
                                                 
1 Further details about the application to the PNAA and a guideline for self assessment can be 
downloaded from PROFEPA’s website.  
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As consequences of the establishment of the Good Practices, the following results are 
expected:  
* Collaboration among the stakeholders, including trust and good communication 
* Reduction of energy resources; 
* Reduction on the consumption of drinking water; 
* Decrease of waste generation and increase its recycling; 
* Minimize the environmental effect of the atmospheric emissions, the noises and the 
waste water; 
* Improving the competitiveness of the business through the following benefits: 
a) Rationalization of raw materials and saving of natural resources;  
b) Improvement of industrial processes and increase of efficiency; 
c) Continuous improvement of the environment protection; 
d) Improvement of the corporate image, users and workers;  
e) Good integration of the personnel. 
 
The auditing procedure involves 3 actors: industry, government and an external auditor. 
This last one must be accredited by the national entity of accreditation (“Entidad 
Mexicana de Accreditation” EMA). This corresponds to the first step in the process, the 
choice of auditor from a list published by PROFEPA. In Mexico there are 334 official 
auditors and 95 units of verification. The fact that a third party is included during the 
auditing activities makes the process more transparent in the authority’s eyes. In the 
elaboration of the action plan, the external auditor can express an opinion and reject the 
plan when he considers it insufficient or not possible to realize it with the resources 
(time, technology, budget) described.  
 
The “Clean Industry certification” is assigned for 2 years, during that period they will 
have some supervising visits according to the action plan. If the industry complies with 
the plan, then it can renew the certification. 
 
PROFEPA has extended the voluntary programs to other sectors, like “municipality 
clean”, “tourist destination clean” and “basin clean”. In consequence the legal 
framework is specific for each sector and also the approach to involve more 
participants. During the Raul Tornel’s presentation at the GIN conference of 2007 in 
Mexico, he showed an impressing list of industries, municipalities and tourist 
destinations that have already subscribed to PNAA. His message was very encouraging 
and made clear that people in PROFEPA have high expectations for such kinds of 
voluntary agreements.  
 
With all successes of this program there remains the observation that it attracts mostly 
the bigger companies that are often not lagging in environmental performance to begin 
with. The inclusion of the much larger number of medium and smaller companies is a 
real challenge, as is the stimulation of environmental improvement on a medium and 
longer tern, much beyond two years. For this reason we also did some explorative 
research on to what extent the Dutch good experience with a specific kind of voluntary 
approach (negotiated agreements with sectors of industry) would fit the present situation 
in Mexico. 
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4. Explorative survey of attitudes towards the application of negotiated agreements 
in the Mexican framework 
 
In the spring of 2008 a survey has been send to Mexican business leaders that are 
involved in environmental matters. The response was 16, until the beginning of June. 
The respondents represent a wide array of Mexican industries. They include the sectors 
of food industry, chemicals (3), metals, non-metal products (2), concrete, pharmaceutics 
(3), construction, glass, car parts and environmental consultancies (2). Of the 16, 9 have 
a predominantly administrative function, like general management, 6 a predominantly 
technical function, like environmental management, and 1 a predominantly external 
relations function. Most are quite senior also in terms of number of years with the 
company. Four work 3  years or less with the company, four up to 6 years and eight 
more than 6 years. Most of them (13) are members of an environmental board or 
committee of their company. Six are members of an environmental committee of their 
sector of industry. Only one is none of those. In addition two are members of 
government environmental committees and three are active members of NGOs.  
 
Questions were asked about the evaluation of the present state of Mexican 
environmental policy, the options to improve the set of policy instruments or their 
implementation, the importance of several possible characteristics of negotiated 
agreements and about some conditions that impact on their success. These questions 
were inspired by the ex post evaluation study on the Dutch system of environmental 
negotiated agreement that has been concluded a few years ago (De Bruijn, Bressers & 
Lulofs 2003, Bressers and De Bruijn 2005a, 2005b, Bressers, De Bruijn & Lulofs 
2008).  
 
Because we could not be sure that all respondents had a clear and a similar idea of what 
negotiated agreements are all about, we introduced the questionnaire with the following 
text: 
"Negotiated agreements are defined as the “commitments undertaken by firms and 
sector associations, which are the result of negotiations with public authorities and/or 
explicitly recognized by the authorities”. They can be regarded as a subspecies of 
‘voluntary approaches’. Unilateral commitments and public voluntary programs, like 
“Industria Limpia”, are other forms of such approaches. But compared to real voluntary 
approaches, it is much more oriented towards mid and long term improvements in 
environmental performance. It is not uncommon in Europe that industry itself takes the 
initiative to start negotiations. This makes sense, especially in cases when it seems 
inevitable that government will push one way or another for substantial environmental 
improvements. Negotiating and agreeing on a 5 or even 10 year schedule that fits 
normal business investment schemes might then be preferred over awaiting regularly 
changing top-down regulations. The advantage for government can be that 
environmental considerations start paying a role earlier in business’ decision making 
processes and the advantage for business is that environmental requirements come less 
as a disruption of normal business processes. The negotiated agreement is often 
concluded at a higher scale level than individual companies, for instance a sector of 
industry in a certain state, and its progress followed by joint committees, in which 
mutual trust can be build over time. Licensing on a company level is then guided by the 
agreement, serving as a framework enabling companies to know where policy is 
heading for, also on the longer term." 
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All respondents thus got a similar stimulus clarifying what the basic idea of negotiated 
agreements is all about.  
 
In the next section we will present the data from this survey in connection with the data 
from the evaluation study on the Dutch negotiated agreements (this is the study on 
environmental negotiated agreements, for a study on energy efficiency negotiated 
agreements, see Bressers, de Bruijn and Dinica 2007). This way the attitudes of the 
Mexican business leaders can be compared with the results obtained from Dutch 
practice.  
 
 
5. Results and discussion of data 
 
5.1 Evaluating Mexican environmental policy and options for improvement  
 
When asked the question “What is your opinion about the Mexican environmental 
policy instruments for improving the environmental performance of companies?” no 
one answered that the existing environmental policy instruments are sufficient and 
reasonably well implemented. That “the existing environmental policy instruments are 
as such sufficient, but not consistently enough implemented to get an equal competition 
situation”, was adhered to by 11 respondents, while 5 even think that “the existing 
environmental policy instruments are not sufficient or are inapt to be implemented well 
in the Mexican situation”. All five are members of company committees. The two that 
are members of government advisory boards both hold the last opinion.  
 
Better instrumentation 
We asked them to consequently choose one or more options (or add themselves more) 
to improve implementation or instrumentation. Of the five that think instrumentation is 
lacking all want addition economic instruments, three want more or different regulative 
instruments, two more information instruments and three (plus one that sees 
implementation is lacking) more negotiated agreements. One respondent added the 
importance of social responsibility. Another respondent remarks that: “The 
"agreements" are an excellent option. The majority of the productive sectors should be 
included and especially the small and medium industry should be aligned to the 
"agreements" since this is the type of industry that normally is not considered in the 
projects of environmental politics and also produces more damage or do not accomplish 
the norms. On the other hand there should be other economic instruments that help that 
the projects to be viable.”  
 
In the Dutch situation, negotiated agreements are not replacing permitting and 
enforcement, but create a framework for them (apart from giving guidance for further 
developments) (Bressers and de Bruijn 2005b). In the figure below this relationship is 
elaborated.  
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Figure 2, Input-process-output model of environmental policy implementation 
combining individual regulation and sectoral negotiated agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Improving implementation 
Thirteen people filled in the questions on how to improve implementation, also two of 
the five that blamed instrumentation in the first place. Of these all but one saw an 
important role for negotiated agreements as a framework for implementation guidance. 
Using a combination of grants and requirements to local authorities (the way the efforts 
to improve implementation started in the Netherlands before the negotiated agreements 
and continued all through the nineties) was also mentioned often. One respondent 
remarks: “There should be a higher diffusion of support programs from  the federal 
government and demanding of development for Environmental Politics programs to 
municipal and state level; continuity of support programs, it means that those programs 
remain in despite of change of governors.” 
 
The issue of political support is carried especially by those who work relatively short in 
this field in their companies (Spearman’s Rho is .727, p=.002, n=13).   
 
 
Table 4, Relation between length of employment and assessment of need for more 
political support 
Employment * More political support needed Crosstabulation
Count
3 0 3
2 1 3
1 6 7
6 7 13
1-3 years
3-6 years
more than 6 years
Employment
Total
yes no
More political support
needed
Total
 
 
Not surprisingly the need for more political support often coincides with feeling the 
need for more local capacity building (Rho .415, p=.079, n=13). 
 
 
Negotiation 
on covenant Covenant text; 
Relations 
Application  
follow up 
negotiations 
Permit giving 
Enforcement 
Standards; 
Env. plans; 
Relations 
Permits + 
conditions 
Pressures 
Behavior of 
companies 
involved 
Emissions 
and  re-
source use 
Environ-
mental  Law 
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Table 5, Relation between assessments of need for more local capacity building and 
more political support 
More local capacity needed * More political support needed
Crosstabulation
Count
5 3 8
1 4 5
6 7 13
yes
no
More local capacity
needed
Total
yes no
More political support
needed
Total
 
 
 
Here an overview of the questions and the answers is given:  
“If you consider only the present implementation of policy instruments lacking, please 
indicate what policy changes could improve this situation (you may tick more than 
one)”: 
- 8x More grants for local authorities to hire good staff, combined with obligatory 
reporting on implementation to higher authorities 
- 2x More obligatory public transparency of business concerning resource use and 
emissions 
- 6x Clearer political support from higher authorities to take environmental law 
seriously 
- 12x Creating a negotiated agreement per state and / or sector of industry that 
specifies priorities and creates an agreed framework for implementation  
- 3x Other, please describe … 
 
The “other” ideas often were connected to the functioning of the political system. One 
wrote: “More coordination among the different levels of government (authorities)”. 
Another: “Better distribution of responsibilities and attributions in the government 
across the different levels (federal, state and municipal). Also, a higher efficiency in the 
transversal coordination (inter ministries); creation of visible environmental incentives 
for the best environmental performance.” A third one: “Elimination of corruption within 
the authorities” and “The application of the Environmental Law to all size of industries 
(large, medium and small). In the current situation only the large and some medium 
industries are inspected.” 
 
All in all, 14 of 16 favour the use of negotiated agreements for one of those two 
purposes, mostly to support implementation and not as a ‘stand alone’ instrument. This 
is very interesting, since most Dutch examples of environmental negotiated agreements 
are also not stand alone instruments. 
 
5.2 Expectations to be met by negotiated agreements  
 
Ambition of negotiated agreements 
One could wonder whether the respondents only see the negotiated agreements 
approach as a “soft” and business friendly way of environmental policy, in fact a way to 
avoid and postpone real environmental improvements. Therefore we asked them how 
serious the agreements should be in their visions.  
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Table 6, “When government would conclude a multi-year negotiated agreement with 
your sector of industry what would be necessary objectives to make this worthwhile?” 
  
 Entirely 
 agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Entirely 
disagree 
Ambition: the objectives should 
be beyond existing regulation 
10 4 1   1 
Ambition: the objectives should 
be beyond “business as usual” 
7 8    1 
Ambition: the objectives should 
imply real ecological innovation  
4 8 3   1 
Compliance: the agreements 
should be guarded against “free 
riders” that spoil the joint effort  
10 5  1   
 
 
Only one of the respondents did clearly want to avoid high ambitions, except for 
guarding against free-riders. This last subject was deemed unimportant by one other 
respondent. All others hold the opinion that negotiated agreements only make sense 
when they really further environmental improvements.  
 
The interviewees with a more technical function rather than a administrative one seem 
to be more restrictive (or pessimistic) on striving for real ecological innovations (Rho 
.378, p=.073, n=16).  
 
 
Table 7, relation between function and ambition 
 
Function * Ambition real innovation Crosstabulation
Count
3 6 1 0 10
1 2 2 1 6
4 8 3 1 16
Administrative
Technical
Function
Total
entirely agree agree neutral
entirely
disagree
Ambition real innovation
Total
 
 
 
Indicated by the answers and by separate cross tabulations (not shown) it is clear that 
the respondents see the Mexican existing regulation as the weakest ambition, even 
weaker than ‘business-pas-usual’. This is unlike the Netherlands’ study, where the 
ambition of regulation was seen as beyond business-as-usual.  
 
In the Netherlands, respondents in the evaluation study on the practice of negotiated 
agreements (Bressers, de Bruijn and Lulofs, 2008 forthcoming) assessed that the 
negotiated agreements were indeed beyond existing regulation (75% agreed), beyond 
business as usual (86% agreed), implied real ecological innovation (68% agreed), and 
were guarded against free riders (72% agreed).  
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Efficiency of negotiated agreements 
Apart from the results for the environment, also the efficiency of the effort is a core goal 
of the negotiated agreement approach. We also asked how important several efficiency 
aspects are in their visions.  
 
Table 8, “When government would conclude a multi-year negotiated agreement with 
your sector of industry what would be necessary efficiency gains to make this 
worthwhile?” 
 
 Entirely 
 agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Entirely 
disagree 
General efficiency: minimisation 
of total costs 
7 6 2 1   
1. Better allocation of efforts 
among companies to lower costs 
6 5 5   
 2. Better phasing of objectives 
and measures in time 
4 10 1 1   
 3. Decrease bureaucratic and 
administrative costs 
 7 5 2 2   
 4. Support development of new 
methods and technologies 
 10 4 1 1   
 
Of course it is not surprising that the efficiency gains of the negotiated agreements are 
generally seen as important. Interesting though is that this is clearly less outspoken 
when redistribution of efforts among companies is involved or when decreasing 
administrative costs is considered. Strongest is the hope that new methods and 
technologies will be supported this way.  
 
That allocative efficiency is needed has the strongest support among the technically 
oriented respondents (Rho .727, p=.001, n=16). Respondents that work longer than six 
years in the company are somewhat more relaxed than the others in assessing the need 
for efficiency in general, and in administrative efficiency in particular. (Rho .533, 
p=.017, n=16).  
 
 
Table 9, Relation between length of employment and administrative efficiency need 
assessment 
Administrative efficiency needed * Employment Crosstabulation
Count
3 3 1 7
0 1 4 5
1 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
4 4 8 16
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
Administrative
efficiency
needed
Total
1-3 years 3-6 years
more than
6 years
Employment
Total
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Administrative efficiency is also stressed by people that see more political support as a 
solution for implementation problems (Rho .570, p=.021, n=13).  
 
 
Table 10, Relation between more political support as solution to implementation 
problems and administrative efficiency need assessment 
 
Administrative efficiency needed * More political support needed
Crosstabulation
Count
5 2 7
1 3 4
0 1 1
0 1 1
6 7 13
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
Administrative
efficiency
needed
Total
yes no
More political support
needed
Total
 
 
 
There is a relation between the evaluation of Mexican environmental policy and the 
assessment of the need that negotiated agreements should contribute to efficiency (Rho 
.739, p=.001, n=16). The respondents that see more fundamental problems with the 
policy than implementation problems alone think less strongly about efficiency gains.  
 
 
Table 11, Relation between evaluation of environmental policy and efficiency need 
assessment 
 
Efficiency needed * Evaluation environmental policy Crosstabulation
Count
7 0 7
4 2 6
0 2 2
0 1 1
11 5 16
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
Efficiency
needed
Total
implement
ation is
insufficient
instruments
insufficient
or not
implementa
ble
Evaluation environmental
policy
Total
 
 
 
In the Dutch evaluation study on the practice of negotiated agreements it was assessed 
that the negotiated agreements were minimizing total costs (55% agreed), especially by 
creating improvements in phasing flexibility (75% agreed) and allocation of efforts 
(96% disagreed with the proposition that better allocation could have lowered costs). 
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There was less support that they led to lessen administrative costs (48% agreed) and that 
new methods and technologies were developed (44% agreed). While the latter two are 
less encouraging, by and large one could claim that the Dutch performance makes the 
desired efficiency gains look realistic goals. This is however somewhat less true than 
was the case with the ambition of the agreements.  
 
Positive side-effects of negotiated agreements 
The Dutch study also revealed the large impact of the use of negotiated agreements on 
“the policy resource base” (De Clercq a/o. 2002: 57-59). All kinds of positive side 
effects can contribute to the feasibility of further steps in the future. To what degree the 
surveyed Mexican business leaders deem those important?    
 
 
Table 12, “When government would conclude a multi-year negotiated agreement with 
your sector of industry what would be desirable side effects to make it extra 
worthwhile?” 
 
 Entirely 
 agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Agreeing 
in Dutch 
study (%)
Improved target group attitude on 
the environment 
8 7 1  74% 
More mutual understanding 
between partners 
4 9 3  78% 
Improved collaboration between 
government and business 
9 7   80% 
More knowledge on options for 
environmental improvements 
8 7 1  69% 
Contributions to future env. 
policy development  
8 8   64% 
Product or process innovations 8 5 2 1 55% 
New methods & technologies 8 8   44% 
More coherence in environmental 
policies regarding industry   
10 5 1  77% 
More harmonisation between 
environmental and other policies 
regarding industry   
11 4  1 64% 
 
 
Again it is not surprising that large majorities find a list of nice side effects worthwhile. 
Issues that regard the coherence of policies seem to have the largest support: among all 
industry policies, among environmental policies and in general the cooperation between 
government and business.  
 
When correlated with the characteristics of the business leaders there seems to be some 
relation between experience (the length of the employment) and the importance attached 
to more mutual understanding (Rho .317, p=.115, n=16).  
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Table 13, Relation between length of employment and importance contribution to 
mutual understanding 
 
Mutual understanding * Employment Crosstabulation
Count
0 1 3 4
3 2 4 9
1 1 1 3
4 4 8 16
entirely agree
agree
neutral
Mutual understanding
Total
1-3 years 3-6 years
more than
6 years
Employment
Total
 
 
 
That these kinds of expectations from a negotiated agreement approach could be 
realistic is shown by the results of the Dutch study. In the table the total of ‘entirely 
agree’ and ‘agree’ (in percentages) is listed in the last column (the ‘entirely disagree’ 
column was empty). From the Dutch results it is clear that not only the ‘new product 
and process innovations’ that were the least strongly wanted among Mexican business 
leaders, but also the ‘new methods and technologies’ have a relatively weak 
performance. In all other cases Dutch practice was however quite encouraging towards 
the wishes of the Mexican business leaders.  
 
 
5.3 Feasibility of negotiated agreements in Mexico 
 
We compared Mexican wishes regarding the negotiated agreement approach with Dutch 
practice. But how realistic is that? Their feasibility and success are not only a matter of 
support among business leaders, but also a matter of favorable conditions. In both the 
European Neapol study and the Dutch evaluation four explanatory factors for negotiated 
agreement success were theoretically derived and empirically assessed. This analysis 
supported the value of these factors to explain the negotiated agreements success 
(Bressers and De Bruijn  2005a). These factors are listed in the table below. In their 
analysis of the feasibility of negotiated agreements in China, Bressers and Xue (2007) 
also included two additional factors and the wider economical, cultural etceteras 
contexts, something that we cannot repeat here in the setting of this paper.  
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Table 14, “To what degree do you think that the following favourable conditions for the 
successful application of negotiated agreements are met in the case of your sector of 
industry?” 
 
 Entirely 
 agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Entirely 
disagree 
There is already a basic level of 
respect and trust in “fair play” 
between the sector and 
government 
5 7 3 1   
The sector is homogeneous or has 
a small number of companies or 
has a sector organisation that is 
well respected by the companies  
5 8 2 1  
The sector is directly or indirectly 
producing for consumers and thus 
concerned about its public image 
8 8    
The authorities seem to be 
prepared to use other instruments 
than negotiation to get the sector 
improving its environmental 
performance  
4 3 5 3 1 
 
The respondents are quite optimistic about the situation regarding the four conditions 
that are important for negotiated agreements success as studied and confirmed in 
previous studies.  This is least true for the willingness of the authorities to exert pressure 
by new alternative instruments when cooperation fails. There the respondents obviously 
doubt whether that would be so in their case. For all, their public image is regarded as 
economically important and worth protecting. Almost all see their sector as well enough 
represented to be able to negotiate. Even the issue of a basic level of trust between 
government and industry – that some doubt to be part of the Mexican societal and 
political culture – is regarded by the respondents as quite favourable in the cases of their 
industries. This is also related to the experience of the respondents. The longer the 
respondent works for the company the more favourable the level of trust between 
industry and government in their sector is assessed (Rho .436, p=.036, n=16). 
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Table 15, Relation between length of employment and assessment of level of trust 
between government and industry in the own sector of industry 
 
 
Basic level respect and trust * Employment Crosstabulation
Count
1 1 3 5
0 2 5 7
2 1 0 3
1 0 0 1
4 4 8 16
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
Basic level
respect
and trust
Total
1-3 years 3-6 years
more than
6 years
Employment
Total
 
 
 
People that are more positive about the level of trust are significantly less inclined to see 
more political support as the solution to implementation problems (Rho -.780, p=.001, 
n=13).  
 
 
Table 16, Relation between more political support as solution to implementation 
problems and assessment of level of trust between government and industry in the own 
sector of industry 
 
Basic level respect and trust * More political support needed
Crosstabulation
Count
0 4 4
2 3 5
3 0 3
1 0 1
6 7 13
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
Basic level
respect
and trust
Total
yes no
More political support
needed
Total
 
 
 
People that assess the preparedness of government to use alternative instruments as a 
thread if necessary attach more importance to improving mutual cooperation as a side 
effect of negotiated agreements (Rho .464, p=.036, n=16).  
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Table 17, Relation between preparedness of government to use alternative instruments 
as a thread if necessary and importance of improving mutual cooperation  
 
Alternative thread * Mutual cooperation Crosstabulation
Count
4 0 4
2 1 3
1 4 5
2 1 3
0 1 1
9 7 16
entirely agree
agree
neutral
disagree
entirely disagree
Alternative
thread
Total
entirely agree agree
Mutual cooperation
Total
 
 
 
The table below shows some more or less comparable answers in the Dutch study. Note 
that the phrasing of the questions here deviates from the one we used in our survey 
under Mexican business leaders.  
 
 
Table 18, Conditions for negotiated agreements’ success in the Netherlands 
 
 
In % Entirely 
 agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Entirely 
disagree 
Before the negotiation there was 
already trust between the sector 
and government 
2 47 6 37 8 
The representative sector 
organisation could negotiate on 
behalf of the member companies  
31 39 2 26 2 
The public image of the sector or 
its product is sensitive to 
environmental aspects 
28 55  18  
The authorities saw it as a 
realistic option to use other 
instruments when negotiations 
would fail  
16 47  37  
 
 
The figures do not indicate that the Dutch circumstances were dramatically more 
favourable than the Mexican respondents are estimated in our survey. There is however 
one exception. That is not the “cultural” factor of trust, but the “political” one, on the 
preparedness to use a “stick behind the door” in case the negotiations fail. This is 
regarded with some doubt among our Mexican respondents.  
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this paper we first described Mexican environmental policy and the present role of 
voluntary approaches therein. While ISO 14000 remains the most commonly used 
format for voluntary efforts by companies in Mexico, there is also a national scheme 
“Industria Limpia”, or Clean Industry, that has more and more participation, especially 
among the bigger companies. Though voluntary, participation is by no means non-
committal. An elaborate auditing program belongs to the scheme. This shows that there 
is some openness in Mexico regarding the options for non-regulatory environmental 
policy.  
 
In the second part of the paper we report on the basis of a survey among 16 Mexican 
business leaders that have responsibilities in the environmental management of their 
companies. None of them evaluated Mexican environmental policy as sufficient. 
Implementation is insufficient and several also think instrumentation is inapt. In those 
cases especially economic policy instruments are seen as a necessary addition, while 
also negotiated agreements are positively viewed. To improve implementation 
negotiated agreements as a framework to guide implementation is widely supported. 
Expectations regarding ambition, efficiency gains and positive side effects of the 
respondents look quite realistic giving the practical results as assessed in a study on the 
Dutch experience with negotiated agreements. The feasibility and success of negotiated 
agreements is in theoretical and empirical literature explained by four factors. The 
respondents assess these factors as quite favorable in the situation of their sectors of 
industry in Mexico. More research is necessary to gain further insight into the options 
and conditions for applying negotiated agreements in the Mexican context.  
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